This is a working draft. This document may be modified, replaced, or discarded at any time.

For the latest release candidate or approved version, please use the version selector.

Version 1.0 is the current version. See the Version 1.0 documentation.

Future directions

The initial draft version (v0.1) of SLSA had a larger scope including protections against tampering with source code and a higher level of build integrity (Build L4). This page collects some early thoughts on how SLSA might evolve in future versions to re-introduce those notions and add other additional aspects of automatable supply chain security.

Build track

Build L4

A build L4 could include further hardening of the build platform and enabling corraboration of the provenance, for example by providing complete knowledge of the build inputs.

The initial draft version (v0.1) of SLSA defined a “SLSA 4” that included the following requirements, which may or may not be part of a future Build L4:

  • Pinned dependencies, which guarantee that each build runs on exactly the same set of inputs.
  • Hermetic builds, which guarantee that no extraneous dependencies are used.
  • All dependencies listed in the provenance, which enables downstream verifiers to recursively apply SLSA to dependencies.
  • Reproducible builds, which enable other build platforms to corroborate the provenance.

Source track

A Source track will provide protection against tampering of the source code prior to the build.

The current draft version (v1.1) describes levels of increasing tamper resistance and ways consumers might verify properties of source revisions using SLSA source provenance attestations.

Build Environment track

The goal of a Build Environment track is to enable the detection of tampering with core components of the compute environment executing builds.

The current draft version of the Build Environment track includes the following requirements:

  • Generation and verification of SLSA Build Provenance for build images.
  • Validation of initial build environment system state against known good reference values.
  • Deployment of the hosted build platform on a compute system that supports system state measurement and attestation capabilities at the hardware level.

These requirements are subject to significant change while this track is in draft.

Build Platform Operations track

A Build Platform Operations track could provide assurances around the hardening of build platforms as they are operated.

The initial draft version (v0.1) of SLSA included a section on common requirements that formed the foundation of the guidance for verifying build systems, which may or may not form the basis for a future Build Platform Operations track:

  • Controls for approval, logging, and auditing of all physical and remote access to platform infrastructure, cryptographic secrets, and privileged debugging interfaces.
  • Conformance to security best practices to minimize the risk of compromise.
  • Protection of cryptographic secrets used by the build platform.